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Asked: 2024-09-24 12:15 UTC
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SOURCE QUESTION

Who will win the presidential election in 2024?

CREATOR STORY BRIEF

People badly underestimated how many others expect Trump to win in 2024

Respondents assumed belief in a Trump victory was fringe, but once they compared notes, it was far more common than most had guessed, even among those who personally expected Harris to win.

LIKELY REALITY
Harris

COMMON EXPECTATION
Trump

CONFIDENCE BAND
medium

DISTRIBUTION

OPTION

OPINION

PREDICTION

Sample size: 21 responses (pilot).

OPTION	OPINION	PREDICTION
Harris	62%	86%
Trump	38%	14%

FULL ARTICLE BODY

In this sample of voters asked who they thought would win the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the biggest surprise wasn't the horse race itself. It was how wrong people were about what everyone else expected.

When participants were asked to predict the room's expectations before seeing any results, they tended to treat a Trump victory as a relatively rare forecast. Many assumed that most others would be clustered around expecting Kamala Harris to win, and that those predicting a Trump win were a small minority.

Once answers were revealed, that assumption broke down. Belief in a Trump victory showed up far more often than people had anticipated. The expectation that Trump would win was not a fringe position in this group; it was a substantial part of the room, badly underread by participants who had mentally relegated it to the margins.

Gender patterns reinforced how skewed these social readings could be. Among respondents who gave the same election answer themselves, men and women were more likely to guess that the broader room leaned toward expecting Harris to win, while women in that same-answer group were more likely to think the room leaned toward expecting Trump to win. A separate cluster of dissenters also read the room as Harris-leaning. In other words, even people who agreed on the likely winner diverged sharply in how they imagined everyone else's expectations.

At the aggregate level, the discussion did settle around Harris as a kind of center of gravity: she emerged as the clearest focal point of expectation, ahead of Trump and giving the room a firmer center than a simple plurality might imply. But that center masked a key misperception. Within this particular sample, people systematically underestimated how common it was to expect Trump to win — a blind spot that only became visible once everyone's private forecasts were laid side by side.

This pattern is specific to the group studied and shouldn't be projected onto the entire electorate. Still, inside this room, the gap between what people thought others believed and what others actually believed was stark, and it ran most strongly through expectations of a Trump victory.

MAIN STORY

The room misread how common a Trump-win prediction really was

Inside this room, expecting a Trump victory was far less fringe than people assumed. Respondents guessed that relatively few others would back Trump, only to find that belief showing up much more often than they thought. The gap between what people expected to hear and what actually surfaced reveals a quiet bloc of Trump-win predictions hiding in plain sight.

Even with the same answer, men and women and women imagined different rooms

Beneath shared predictions, the room split over what felt socially typical. In this sample, men and women who gave the same election answer tended to picture others lining up behind Harris, while women were more likely to imagine the room expecting Trump instead, with a separate dissenting cluster also reading the crowd as leaning toward Harris. The same checkbox on the survey masked competing stories about who was really in the majority.

STORY ANGLES

Harris anchored the room's expectations, even without full unanimity

For all the crosscurrents, Harris still sat at the center of this room's 2024 forecasts. A clear share of respondents treated a Harris victory as the default outcome, putting her noticeably ahead of Trump and giving the conversation a stable focal point. It was not unanimity, but it was a firm enough center that the room felt more aligned than a bare plurality label would imply.

A Trump-backing subgroup knew they were the minority and expected others to say Harris

One small cluster in the room lined up firmly behind a Trump victory while simultaneously predicting that most others would name Harris. Their stance did not wobble, and neither did their expectation that they were out of step with the crowd. That combination of internal agreement and clear-eyed read of others turns this subgroup into a sharp signal rather than just background noise.

UNCERTAINTY BOUNDARY

A real split in this room, not a law about everyone

The divides in how different groups read the room are genuine inside this sample, but the evidence stops at these respondents. The story can point to those contrasts as real features of this crowd without stretching them into universal claims about how all men, women, or voters see the 2024 race.

Boundary: This finding is real inside this sample, but it stops there. The story can name the pattern without pretending it is universal.

EVIDENCE NOTES

These notes are the receipts behind the story. They are evidence, not finished prose.

BIAS

The TruTake answer 'Trump' was underpredicted by 24%: it was chosen by 38% of responses, but the people expected it to appear in only 14%.

Claim: People misjudged the consensus by underestimating how many others expect Trump to win the 2024 election.

Why it matters: This is a journalistic blind-spot claim, not just a statistical one. It says people were not only choosing answers - they were misjudging what would feel socially common or visible.

CONTEXT

Within the subgroup behind the eventual answer, people shared a concentrated forecast that others would choose "Harris".

Claim: A coherent subgroup aligned around the belief that Trump would win, while also sharing a concentrated forecast that others would choose Harris.

Why it matters: This is a subgroup-coherence claim. It says one subgroup's own stance becomes a meaningful signal because that subgroup also shared a concentrated forecast of what others would say.

DISTRIBUTION EVIDENCE ONLY

Expectations were more aligned than the answers; the outcome was more mixed than people assumed.

Claim: People misjudged the consensus by underestimating how many others expect Trump to win the 2024 election.

Why it matters: This is a journalistic blind-spot claim, not just a statistical one. It says people were not only choosing answers - they were misjudging what would feel socially common or visible.

DISTRIBUTION EVIDENCE ONLY

The leading answer was "Harris", ahead of "Trump" by about 24%.

Claim: The room showed a settled consensus around Harris as the expected winner of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, with Harris clearly ahead of Trump.

Why it matters: That gives the story a firmer center: the crowd was more aligned than a simple plurality framing would suggest.

BIAS

The answer 'Harris' was overpredicted: it was chosen by 62% of responses, but the people expected it to appear in around 86%.

Claim: People misjudged the consensus by underestimating how many others expect Trump to win the 2024 election.

Why it matters: This is a journalistic blind-spot claim, not just a statistical one. It says people were not only choosing answers - they were misjudging what would feel socially common or visible.

CITATION-BACKED INSIGHTS

Showing strongest 3 of 5

BIAS_EXPECTATION SUPPORT 1.00

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People underestimate how many expect a Trump win.

DISTRIBUTION SUPPORT 1.00

The room showed a settled consensus around Harris as the expected winner of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, with Harris clearly ahead of Trump.

That gives the story a firmer center: the crowd was more aligned than a simple plurality framing would suggest.

People leaned toward Harris as the expected 2024 winner.

CONTEXT **SUPPORT 1.00**

A coherent subgroup aligned around the belief that Trump would win, while also sharing a concentrated forecast that others would choose Harris.

This is a subgroup-coherence claim. It says one subgroup's own stance becomes a meaningful signal because that subgroup also shared a concentrated forecast of what others would say.

A strong but revealing signal aligned around Trump winning.

CREATOR HOOKS

People underestimate how many expect a Trump win.

People leaned toward Harris as the expected 2024 winner.

A strong but revealing signal aligned around Trump winning.

Men and women see others expecting Harris; women see others expecting Trump more.

This pattern is real in this sample, but does not extend beyond it.

When asked who is expected to win the 2024 U.S. presidential election, people significantly underread how common the belief in a Trump victory actually is, assuming that expectation would be much rarer than it turned out to be.

CROWD PERSONAS

Aware Dissenters (~38%)

HIGHEST CALIBRATION (SAMPLE)

Trump + Expected Harris

About 38% of people chose "Trump" and expected "Harris" to be the most common answer. They held a less common view, but accurately read where most people would land. This group shows dissent without misreading where most people stand.

Confident Aligners (~48%)

HIGHER CALIBRATION

Harris + Expected Harris

About 48% of people chose "Harris" and expected "Harris" to be the most common answer. They matched the dominant view and correctly anticipated that others would feel the same way. This group reinforces the core consensus.

Positive but Unsure (≈14%)

LOWEST CALIBRATION (SAMPLE)

Harris + Expected Trump

The 14% in the Positive but Unsure group personally say Harris will win, yet they expect Trump to come out ahead. These people hold a majority view on their own preferred outcome but do not see it as the most likely national result.

Demographic splits are suppressed due to sample size.